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Abstract
Inspired by the impact of science and technology on Western
society, many Eastern  leaders requested their societies to learn
and live in by logic of science and technology.  In this instrumen-
talist point of view, we control technology, or technology, as tool,
can be controled to serve human interests. The article, however,
wishes to suggest that our existence can be technologically tex-
tured (with respect to the rhythms and spaces of our daily life), or
that technology controls us. This article, following the phenom-
enological reflections of Martin Heidegger, proposes a thesis that
the relationship between technology and humans are ambiguous.
On the one hand, technology can become a stock which is ready
to use for our interests, but on the other hand, it can enframe
human beings according to its created systems. In such a situa-
tion, the thinking or questioning, of this essence of technology,
can be seen as a way towards human freedom and salvation.
INTRODUCTION
In a meeting with the Indonesian Science Academy (ISA), B.J.
Habibie, former president of the Republic of Indonesia requested that
the ISA elevate the quality of Indonesian human resources. He felt con-
vinced that only through the promotion of science and technology can
Indonesia become a superior nation. Like other Asian figures in Asia,
such as Fukuzawa Yukichi and Hashida Kunihiko in Japan,1 Habibie con-
tended that the direction of the way the Eastern people think needs to be
altered in line with the logic of science and technology so that they can
compete with other nations in the Western world.
This attitude implies that science and technology is a system of
learning different from the traditional system of learning. A major differ-
ence between the two systems of learning lay in their distinctive rela-
Prajna Vihara, Volume16, Number 1, January-June 2015, 51-65 51
2000 by Assumption University Press
-       -
c
˜
tionships with the established social order. While much of the traditional
learning buttressed the feudalistic social system, modern natural science
and technology promoted independence from such social order largely
because they were constructed separately from such order. However, the
question remains, if technology has become the texture of human life,2
how can we speak of it giving promise to the future of Eastern nations?
The question is phenomenologically rooted. According to this
perspective, technology is not a technical procedure or a neutral fact iso-
lated from human world. By contrast, all human’s experience in technol-
ogy presupposes a human act and practice which involves the commu-
nity, society, and the world.  Also, our experience in technology is not
merely subjective, but always contains ontological claims about human’s
existence.3  Thus, in our technologies we recognize the world and our-
selves.
To understand the relationship between man and technology, this
article focuses on some important questions such as: what is technology
and how can it present itself? Is there a space for freedom in the techno-
logical world? If there is a room for freedom, is technology neutral? If
not, is it controlled? If it can be controlled, under what authority can it be
controlled? More fundamentally, how can we talk about the relationship
between man and technology?4
THE QUESTION CONCERNING TECHNOLOGY
These questions lead us to examine the question of the essence of
technology. The question itself builds its own way, as Martin Heidegger
put in his Die Frage nach der Technik, a paper which was presented in a
series of academic seminars with the theme “Arts in Technological Era”
held in Munich in 1953.5
Heidegger believed that the question concerning technology is
an extraordinary question. This is because such a question is not consid-
ered through our daily interaction with technology, but through a more
philosophical and fundamental reflection. Moreover, such a question is
considered extraordinary because one’s success in answering this ques-
tion can be seen as an initial step to understand a free relationship with
technology.6
With this in mind, Heidegger began his essay, Die Frage nach
der Technik as follows: “In what follows we shall be questioning con-
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cerning technology”.7 Using italics for the word ‘questioning’ Heidegger
wanted to stress he is conducting a philosophical inquiry, an inquiry which
relies on the ability in human questioning and thinking. Before an audi-
ence who were not all experts in philosophy, Heidegger asserted that the
core of philosophy is thinking, which is unique to humans. Philosophy is
not an alien from human life involving abstract concepts, but a thinking
activity which can be done by everyone, including in this case, artists.
All humans can think and their genuine thoughts can make them free and
open to the existence of reality in general and of technical reality in par-
ticular.8
The same tone is also expressed in his closing mark of the essay.
Heidegger wrote: “For questioning is the piety of thought”.9 The term
“piety” here refers to religious tradition, where thinking is not seen as an
arrogant or dominating attitude, but an obedient and submissive attitude,
It would suggest a submissiveness to the reality which has its own way.
To question technology, therefore, means to listen to the reality of tech-
nology.
With the target of characterizing humans as thinking subjects who
are open to the reality of technology, Heidegger commenced his essay by
criticizing instrumentalism. According to this view, technology is merely
a means to an end. In Heidegger’s view, this idea of instrumentalism is
beneficial for understanding the development of technology and its user
community. War technology, for instance, has developed rapidly in na-
tions suspicious of other nations, and that’s why it has become both an
instrument for self-defense, and one for threatening foes. Machine tech-
nology has developed when the society developed manufacturing indus-
tries in aristocratic societies for the sake of improving productivity. In-
formation Technology developed when information became commodity,
and at the same time, a means for the development of democratic com-
munities after World War II.  However, this instrumental conception of
technology conditions and distorts every attempt to bring man into the
right relation to technology. Heidegger recognized that in the instrumen-
tal approach, humans are conditioned to use technology to dominate. He
writes: “On our manipulating technology in the proper manner as a means,
we will ‘get’ technology ‘spiritually in hand’”.10 Technology is no longer
seen as its own reality, but as only a means for dealing with technical and
social problems humans are facing.
For Heidegger, what is never thought in the instrumental approach
is the fact that technology has its own truth which should not be limited
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to instrumental logic. With this argument, Heidegger wanted to empha-
size that the instrumental approach is not wrong. The technological con-
cept of a thing has even become one of the key thoughts in Being and
Time which was published in 1927. In his example of the hammer,11 he
emphasized that it was not possible for an object to become a thing be-
cause every object always becomes “something for something others”
(Etwas um-zu). However, it needs to be added that technology never be-
comes something which is under our plan and control. Conversely, tech-
nology has its own causality, which brings certain effects which we have
never imagined before.12 It has its own truth which can reveal itself to
us.13 Or to put it in a more extreme manner, technology can become some-
thing through which we can recognize our world more clearly.
To pursue this question concerning technology, Heidegger dis-
cusses Aristotle’s thoughts on causality, namely: causa materialis (the
material cause), causa formalis (the formalist cause), causa finalis (the
final cause), and causa efficiens (the effect or efficient cause). Taking an
example of a silver chalice, which is commonly used in a liturgical cer-
emony, Heidegger tried to explain four sources of causalities which made
the silver chalice possible to be present as an object ready to be used in a
liturgical service.14 Just as a silver chalice has causality in its own prior
to being used in a liturgy, so does technology: every technology has its
own causality which makes it possible to be called technology. In this
way Heidegger highlighted that the instrumental view of the essence of
technology is presupposed by a more fundamental view of causality which
is technology itself. To understand the essence of technology we need to
understand the principles of its causality which undergirds all truth on
technology.
PHENOMENOLOGY OF TECHNOLOGY
The question concerning the essence of technology is not easy to
answer because technology is not equivalent to the essence of technol-
ogy itself.15 With the ambition of using a phenomenological approach,
Heidegger tried to investigate the way technology exists. In a formula-
tion which was almost close to Nietzsche’s style, he tried to explain that
technology itself had a “desire” to manifest itself. It had its own law
which was not determined by humans; on the other hand, humans expe-
rienced it as something moving with its own logic.
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To understand this view, Heidegger used the term bringing-forth
or pro-duction,16 a term he used beforehand in his book Being and Time,
when he talked about humans as Dasein, a being-there, who always exist
in space and time.17 This term contains meaning that technology has the
ability to reveal itself and the world around it. In his example of a watch,
for example, Heidegger explained that in seeing a watch, we also see the
sun as a measurement of time, because the watch was developed in a
theoretical system concerning time and solar rotation. Thus, using a watch
reflects a certain attitude concerning reality.18
A similar understanding is explained using another way in Die
Frage nach der Technik. Heidegger wrote:
We are questioning concerning technology, and we have
arrived now at aletheia, at revealing. What has the es-
sence of technology to do with revealing? The answer:
everything. For every bringing-forth is grounded in re-
vealing…. If we inquire, step by step, into what technol-
ogy, represented as means, actually is, then we shall ar-
rive at revealing. The possibility of all productive manu-
facturing lies in revealing.19
Technology, therefore, is not a mere thing or a means to an end.
Conversely, it has its own existence and way to capture the world, the
place where we live. It is for this reason that technology cannot suffi-
ciently be understood in an instrumental rationality, but it needs to be
viewed comprehensively as a way of existence and revelation where the
existence of technology and the truth of the world can reveal itself
(aletheia).
With this understanding of technology as a way of revealing it-
self, Heidegger did not mean to account for the fact that all kinds of
technology conceal itself in a similar way, but any kinds of technology
can conceal itself differently in accordance with the contexts where tech-
nology develops __ that’s why, this difference determines the way we
view the world and the earth where we live. Here lies the difference
between traditional technology and modern technology.  Traditional farm-
ing technology reveals the unique relationship between farmers and their
world: the knowledge for caring and cultivating (poiesis). By way of
contrast, modern technology, because of its basis in natural science as an
exact science, has the tendency to order the world (Gestell, enframed) as
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a system with a planned intricacy and interest which we ourselves are
unaware of:20 be they in business, political and power engineering, or
education.
To understand this difference Heidegger talked about how the
development of water electricity power and windmills changed the rela-
tionship between humans and their world. Windmills have long emerged
in a period when humans used natural power without changing its sur-
rounding environment. This is in contrast to the hydro-electric dams cre-
ated along the Rhein River, a river which comes from springs in the Alps
and flows through large German cities to the sea. Modern humans who
use the latter technology no longer allow nature to provide energy as was
used in the windmills technology. The hydro-electric dam, and modern
technology provokes/challenges (Herausfordern) nature. If traditional
technology had the character of revealing itself, modern technology pre-
sents itself with the character of provoking/challenging.21
Explaining what he meant by provoking/challenging, Heidegger
expressed his uneasiness with the development of hydro-electric power.
The Rhein River had been challenged to become a source of power which
could be stored and distributed to regions through power lines. As such,
the technology of hydro-eclectric power revealed itself in a certain sys-
tems which was neatly ordered: the energy stored in the nature is trans-
formed; what has been transformed is stored; and what has been stored is
distributed; and what has been distributed can be switched on. Trans-
forming, storing, distributing, and switching on power are systematic
steps of revealing the technology of hydro-electric power.22
Using these examples, Heidegger explains that life in the world
of technology, without our awareness, always means living in the system
of order of the technology. For this reason, the essence of technology
does not lie in certain artifacts but in the technological desire which makes
those certain artifacts show its meaning in a certain system. Being in that
system we view our own world and humans around us differently. The
fundamental issue comes into being in its own: modern technology de-
velops itself and has the tendency to develop itself as a center. Humans
cannot escape themselves from such a realm, meaning that they were as
if being thrown away or entrapped in an instrumental technology point
of view. Humans no longer become free as rational beings. In this per-
spective of technology, the world has never become something in its
own and been approached in a reciprocal care.23 If traditional humans
constructed a wooden bridge so that they pass over the river, while let-
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ting the river flow, modern humans with their technological desires see
the same river as a possibility for a hydro-electric project which can change
the river into a source for further planning. The world, nature and hu-
mans are seen as sources that need to be taken into account, and as such
humans are entrapped in a system of meaning created by technology.
Technology is no longer a means to an end, but an end in itself. Through
technology, nothing is allowed to reveal itself. All things are swept away
together with a massive network. They only bear a meaning, provided
that they have a significant contribution to the whole network. All things
are under the control of these networks. Heidegger calls this condition
Bestand, standing-reserve.24 Technology orders everything for the per-
petuation of its order.
TECHNOLOGICAL FREEDOM
The strength of Heidegger’s philosophy lies in its effort to under-
stand the reality of technology which can reveal itself. However, as has
been alluded to before, Heidegger also asserted that technology can be-
come a Gestell or a metaphysic framework which determines the way
we live and understand the world around us, both nature and humans.
With this new view, the concrete questions for us in the context of the
ethics of technology are: Who holds responsibility for the process of
technological enframing? In what kinds of ethics are we allowed to talk
about technology as enframing?
Heidegger did not specifically talk about the ethics of technol-
ogy. Nevertheless, all his thoughts on technology have on ethical orien-
tation because of his deep understanding of ethical problems. The funda-
mental ethical issue in Heidegger’s thinking is always related to the pos-
sibility of occurrence of the free relationship among humans, technology
and nature, a relationship based on Sorge, care between humans and
humans and between humans and nature. As a consequence, in his es-
says, we never find basic ethics principles as have been expressed in
golden rules, the Sermon on the Mount, or even deontological and utili-
tarian normative theories of ethics. Heidegger even casted doubts over
the basic assumptions of traditional ethics, because in facing with tech-
nological problems, we are not concerned with human superiority, but
with human impotence. If Francis Bacon optimistically expressed his
credo knowledge is power, then Heidegger expresses the pessimistic idea
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that human beings are dominated by their own technologies. He writes:
Where do we find ourselves brought to, if now we think
one step further regarding what Enframing itself actually
is? It is nothing technological, nothing on the order of a
machine. It is the way in which the real reveals itself as
standing-reserve. Again we ask: Does this revealing hap-
pen somewhere beyond all human doing. No. But neither
does it happen exclusively in man, or decisively through
man.25
However, all Heidegger’s philosophy projects concerning tech-
nology is predicated on the conviction that humans are moral subjects
who must hold responsibility for all developments of themselves and
technology, although it must be noted that humans cannot control activi-
ties and technological development, and they even cannot control the
technology’s revealing process where the reality of technology can re-
veal itself to us. “But, never too late comes the question as to whether we
actually experience ourselves as the ones whose activities everywhere,
public and private, are challenged forth by Enframing”. said Heidegger.26
Heidegger, however, sees a way out. “The essence of modern technology
starts man upon the way of that revealing through which the real every-
where, more or less distinctly, becoming standing-reserve. To start upon
a way means to send in our ordinary language. We shall call that send-
ing-that-gather which first starts man upon a way of revealing, destining
(Geschick). It is from out of this destining that the essence of all history
is determined”.27 This means that humans alone can determine their own
fate as a core of their history. In a situation where they find themselves
entrapped in technology as a fate, they still see themselves as a subject
that does not bow to the blind fate,28 because they still have the ability to
hear and listen to their situation.29
For this reason, humans can still attain a degree of freedom to-
ward technological enframing. However, the idea of freedom in
Heideggar’s thinking is not conventional, as has been thought in John
Stuart Mill as a freedom from the shackles of society and politics. Also,
the fundamental essence of freedom is not related to a will or even to
causality of humans’ desire as has been developed in the philosophy of
Immanuel Kant. On the contrary, when speaking of freedom, Heidegger
talks about events or moments of truth.30  Freedom means letting the
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truth penetrate fate, so the reality of the fate can reveal its own path.31
With this concept of freedom, Heidegger reminds us that the tech-
nological enframing process indeed contains a real peril to the relation-
ship between humans with themselves and with their surrounding na-
ture,32 a mechanism which allows us to reveal ourselves only according
to technological logic by ignoring other possibilities to reveal ourselves
through reality of nature. This is a process which can be compared to a
monochromatic picture of world, and leads us to ignore other perspec-
tives such as arts and literature. Heidegger emphasizes that technologi-
cal enframing blocks truth that came spontaneously, and because of this
it could entrap us to ignore the mystery of reality.33 However, he also
emphasized that humans have the ability to release themselves from this
peril. Here Heidegger appeals to Hölderlin’s statement: “But where dan-
ger is, grows the saving power also”34 Salvation is not used here in the
sense of saving something from danger. Instead, it means to reunite some-
thing with its nature in the sense that it acknowledges something as its
origin or home.35 This means that the technological enframing process
tends to endanger, and effort to reunite technology in its essence is an
initial step to salvation. Heidegger wrote: “If the essence of technology,
enframing, is the extreme danger, and if there is truth in Hölderlin’s words,
then the rule of enframing cannot exhaust itself solely in blocking all
lighting-up of every revealing, all appearing of truth. Rather, precisely
the essence of technology must harbor in itself the growth of the saving
power”.36 Technology has the ability to reveal and salvage itself. And for
Heidegger, humans, as Dasein, are called to be a medium where technol-
ogy reveals itself. So, human beings are the subject of power that sal-
vages. Heidegger wrote: “Here and now ... that we may foster the saving
power in its increase. This includes holding always before our eyes the
extreme danger”.37
Heidegger, therefore, was convinced that the development of tech-
nology has ethical function; that is, the ability to salvage humans, if hu-
mans open themselves to the truth of technology. However, Heidegger
himself did not explain in detail how this technological salvation can
take place, if in reality the technological enframing process indeed changes
humans.
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THE PROBLEMS OF THE DEHUMANIZATION
Heidegger’s thoughts on the essence of technology touch on sev-
eral key issues. First, technology conceived of as a machine or instru-
ment. Although the idea on instrumentality has colored Being and Time,
in an essay Die Frage nach der Technik Heidegger candidly rejected
instrumentality. The difference in emphasis is very much determined by
the goal of the essay, namely to account for technology as a process of
revealing the natural and the human. With this goal, technology has func-
tions which are the same as arts and literature whose goals are to reveal
the world. In Heidegger’s view, both art and technology have the same
basis, namely poiesis, a creative ability to reveal itself. Second,
Heidegger’s view that humans are always entrapped in the technological
Gestell process suggests Sophocles’ idea that humans have passed.38 Be-
cause of the Gestell process, humans become an object of technology. Of
course, this does not mean that Heidegger did not have hope. He still
viewed humanity as a historical subject who could direct their destiny if
they are sensitive toward what has been revealed by technology. In other
words, technology is a semantic field which can illuminate the world
where we live. Third, Heidegger realized that human subjectivity is not
determined by their absolute consciousness, but is conditioned by space
and time including the context of technological Gestell. Thus, Heidegger
has paved the way to the postmodernism understanding that humans are
always contextual.  Technological enframing is a form of contextualization
of human existence in their social and cultural scopes.
However, Heidegger does seem to take into account that humans
can no longer be sensitive to what technology reveals or can no longer
maintain a critical attitude towards technology. What Heidegger does
not consider is that technology had contributed to new anxieties. Tech-
nology continues to deepen its own trap. According to Hans Jonas, tech-
nology not only alters the nature, but also alters humans. He provided the
following three examples.39
First, the advancement in the field of biological which can slow
down the aging process in humans. The advancement of knowledge and
technique in this field has a consequence for our view of death. In a
traditional view, we learn that death is inevitable. Traditional humans
believe without questioning the words of the psalmist that “the days of
our years are threescore years; and if by reason of strength they be four-
score years, yet is their strength labor and sorrow; for it is soon cut off,
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and we fly away”.  Yet, the modern technique hitherto seems to have
revived a big dream of George Bernard Shaw and Jonathan Swift that
humans are immortal. It appears that modern humans no longer take heed
of the words of psalmist that say: “So teach us to number our days, that
we may apply our hearts unto wisdom”. (Psalm, 90). Death is no longer
seen as inevitable, but as something to be avoided.  Thus, for the first
time in human history we face the problem of individual desire fighting
against death and fate of humans as a species. Death has no longer had a
positive correlation with a creative newborn, as was envisaged by Hannah
Arendt,40 which give birth to a new generation that brings an optimistic
future.  Can we imagine a generation with long-lived people, without
younger generations? It seems that the discovery in the field of biologi-
cal cell compels humans to realize their own ambition, so that death is
no longer viewed as meaningful for the emergence of a more creative
newborn.
Second, the emergence of scientific behavior-control techniques.
Social engineering approaches are used increasingly for ruling over the
masses. However, the use of the social engineering method has become
a big problem especially when it touches on our ideas of human rights
and of what it means to become humans.  Can we induce drugs to our
kindergarten children so that they can learn easily without being moti-
vated to be independent and to be free as children? Can we program a
child to be an individual who fits the behavior system we desire?
It is perhaps no exaggeration to say here that those questions
emanate from a traditional view that every person has autonomy in the
sense that he can make his own decisions based on his own consider-
ations and be a valuable member in a community. Modern technology
raises a question: How can we account for an individual’s autonomy if
this individual is not seen as a value which needs to be respected? Every
person must be held accountable for recognizing himself as the human
individual he wishes to become.
Third, the new development of genetics and the genetic control
technique over future humans. According to Jonas, humans nowadays
seem to want to determine their own genetic development. Evolution no
longer plays the role of species integrity. But, do we really have the right
to play the role in creating ourselves? What will the human being be-
come in the future?
Aside from the above three instances, we can add another ex-
ample which is related to the advancement of information technology
Mikhael Dua  61
such as television and computer. Many communication experts explain
that information technology can facilitate communication among humans.
However, such technology can entrap us. Concerning television, for ex-
ample, Robert E. Denton, an expert in American political communica-
tion once wrote: “Historically, television was valued as the main instru-
ment of democracy. No other media that can unite us, educate us, and as
a consequence can improve our action and choice over public
policies...(however), because its ability to penetrate, we tend to forget
that television too plays a role as a power and control.41
The above examples highlight that technology is not a mere fruit
of excellence of human civilization. Of course, humans reap many prac-
tical benefits of the development of technology: our life and work has
become easier to deal with.42  However, as has been said by Ihde,43 tech-
nology traps in a technological network which controls our behaviors
and actions. Or in the words of Herbert Marcuse in his One Dimensional
Man and Jacques Ellul in his The Technological Society, technology is
not only dominant, but total, it has changed into a milieu that determines
how humans must live and how a community must be built.
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